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Note
“Over-the-Hill” Yet Still Fighting Uphill Battles to
Find Jobs: The Plight of Older Job Applicants Under
the ADEA
LINDSEY A. VISCOMI
This Note discusses the unresolved issue of whether the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA) protects older job applicants from disparate impact
discrimination, arguing that they should, in fact, be covered. This Note starts with
an examination of the disparate impact framework and how arbitrary employment
qualifications can operate indirectly to restrict the employment of older workers. It
then goes into a statutory analysis of the pertinent sections of the ADEA and
considers several different statutory interpretation methods. This Note will argue
that the interpretation of the statute should align with its underlying purpose, which
is to prohibit employers from discriminating against older people and to help older
workers who have been displaced from work to regain employment.
This Note then summarizes recent case law interpreting the issue, discussing
the most recent developments in differing circuits. Both the Seventh and Eleventh
Circuits have now effectively held that older job applicants do not have an available
disparate impact claim under the ADEA. This Note argues for a different
interpretation of the ADEA that would afford older job applicants the same
protections as other protected groups who face similar barriers in employment.
This Note suggests several remedial measures that may address this problem
for the aging workforce. These recommendations include that advocates bring cases
that enable other circuits to weigh in on this issue and create a circuit split to bring
it to the Supreme Court so that the highest court can clarify the ambiguous language
of the ADEA. Alternatively, a congressional amendment to the ADEA to expressly
include applicants in the language of the statute would eliminate any ambiguity with
respect to discrimination against older applicants for employment.
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“Over-the-Hill” Yet Still Fighting Uphill Battles to
Find Jobs: The Plight of Older Job Applicants Under
the ADEA
LINDSEY A. VISCOMI *
INTRODUCTION
“There is . . . no harsher verdict in most men’s lives than
someone else’s judgment that they are no longer worth their
keep.”1
Today, an “Over-the-Hill” 40th birthday party can implicate more than
just getting closer to obtaining an AARP card. According to the Eleventh
Circuit in Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. (Villarreal II),2 and the
Seventh Circuit in Kleber v. CareFusion Corp. (Kleber II),3 individuals over
forty have no remedy if employers subject them to practices that have a
disparate impact on older job applicants and have no reasonable business
purpose—such as rejecting applicants for being overqualified4 or having too
much experience.5 Yet, recent case law shows that courts have a hard time
deciding this issue, signaling that hope is not yet lost for older applicants.
When the Eleventh Circuit6 and Seventh Circuit7 first considered this issue,
the two courts decided the cases differently, holding that job applicants were
also protected by the same statutory provision that protects current
*
University of Connecticut School of Law, Juris Doctorate Candidate 2020; Bentley University,
magna cum laude, B.S. in Business Management 2017. I would like to extend my greatest thanks to
Professor Jon Bauer for contributing his time and expertise in the development of this Note. I would also
like to acknowledge my colleagues on the Connecticut Law Review for their many diligent edits. Thank
you to my family for their constant love and support—this Note is lovingly dedicated to my late
grandmother, who was always my biggest supporter.
1
REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF LABOR TO THE CONGRESS UNDER SECTION 715 OF THE CIVIL
RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, THE OLDER AMERICAN WORKER: AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT 1
(1965) [hereinafter WIRTZ REPORT].
2
839 F.3d 958 (11th Cir. 2016) [hereinafter Villarreal II] (en banc).
3
914 F.3d 480 (7th Cir. 2019) [hereinafter Kleber II] (en banc).
4
Villarreal II, 839 F.3d at 961 (validating the screening out of applicants with job requirements
which “‘stay[ed] away from’ applicants ‘in sales for 8–10 years’”).
5
Kleber II, 914 F.3d at 481–82 (stating the fact that Dale Kleber had more experience than the job
description required, and CareFusion passed over Kleber, instead hiring a 29-year-old applicant who did
not exceed the prescribed experience requirement).
6
Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 806 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2015) [hereinafter Villarreal
I], vacated, reh’g granted en banc, 839 F.3d 958 (11th Cir. 2016).
7
Kleber v. CareFusion Corp., 888 F.3d 868 (7th Cir. 2018) [hereinafter Kleber I], vacated, reh’g
granted en banc, 914 F.3d 480 (7th Cir. 2019).

508

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:1
8

employees from disparate impact discrimination. Recently, however, both
circuits granted motions for a rehearing en banc, and vacated the Villarreal
I and Kleber I holdings,9 over strong dissents. This Note argues that the
Seventh and Eleventh Circuits got it right the first time. The statutory text,
Congress’s intent, and agency interpretations all point toward recognizing
that job applicants, as well as employees, should be able to bring disparate
impact claims under the ADEA.
Congress enacted the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)
in 1967,10 seeking to prohibit age discrimination in employment.11 This
statute shortly followed Congress’s enactment of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, which prohibited discrimination on the basis of race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.12 These two statutes have played a
significant role in combatting workplace discrimination. Nonetheless, this
Note reveals that the ADEA has yet to be enforced consistently with its
intent.
Before Congress enacted the ADEA, the Department of Labor was
directed to research and study “the factors which might tend to result in
discrimination in employment because of age and the consequences of such
discrimination.”13 The resulting study came to be known as the Wirtz
Report. This Report examined “circumstances which unquestionably affect
older workers more strongly, as a group, than they do younger workers,”14
which included questions of health, educational attainment, and
technological change.15 It notably expressed specific concern about the
plight of older job seekers, finding that there was persistent and widespread
use of age limits in hiring.16 The Report also noted that the type of
discrimination older workers “have most to fear” was not from “employer
malice” but rather from “wholly impersonal forces,” such as the use of
8

See id. at 870 (holding “that § 623(a)(2) [of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967]
protects both outside job applicants and current employees”). See also Villarreal I, 806 F.3d at 1290
(holding that section 4(a)(2) of the ADEA authorizes disparate impact claims by applicants for
employment because “the agency charged with enforcing the ADEA, has reasonably and consistently
interpreted the statute to cover claims like Mr. Villarreal’s”).
9
See Erin Mulvaney, Full US Appeals Court Will Look at Scope of Federal Age-Discrimination
Law, NAT’L L.J. (June 22, 2018, 3:57 PM), https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/2018/06/22/full-us-appeals-court-will-look-at-scope-of-federal-age-discrimination-law/ (declaring the dispute as one “that
tests the power of job applicants, not just current employees, to sue employers for alleged age
discrimination”).
10
See Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (1967)
(stating the act prohibiting age discrimination in employment was enacted on December 15, 1967).
11
29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1994) (“It is therefore the purpose of this chapter . . . to prohibit arbitrary
age discrimination in employment . . . .”).
12
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012).
13
WIRTZ REPORT, supra note 1, at ii.
14
Id. at 11.
15
Id. at 11–13.
16
Id. at 21.
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educational requirements that work against the employment of many older
workers who, at the time of the Report, had less formal education on the
whole than younger workers.17 Therefore, the Wirtz Report recommended
that the government institute a national policy of hiring on the “basis of
ability rather than age.”18 The Report became the catalyst to the enactment
of the ADEA, and courts often refer to the Wirtz Report when analyzing the
intent behind the ADEA. The Wirtz Report makes it clear that Congress
enacted the ADEA in part to address the barriers that older applicants face
when seeking employment.
According to the U.S. Census Bureau, one in every five residents will
be older than sixty-five in 2030.19 The number of older workers is on the
rise20 with about forty percent of people aged fifty-five and older working
or actively looking for work in 2014.21 Because the rate of older workers and
applicants is increasing, the prevalence of this issue is mounting. Therefore,
it is imperative that courts interpret the ADEA consistent with its underlying
intent, which is to protect older applicants from the unfair burdens they face
in their job searches that are not legitimately job-related. The courts should
afford the same protections to older job applicants as other protected groups,
or Congress should amend the ADEA to effectuate its intent to protect older
Americans who are disparately impacted by discriminatory barriers in
hiring.
Part I of this Note reviews the disparate impact framework under Title
VII and the ADEA. Part II considers various methods of statutory
interpretation as they apply to the question of whether job applicants may
bring disparate impact claims under the ADEA, including textual analysis,
comparisons to other provisions of the ADEA and Title VII, the legislative
history, and agency interpretations. This part lays out arguments on both
sides of the issue, analyzing the strengths and weaknesses of each argument.
Part III examines the most recent case law involving claims brought under
the ADEA for disparate impact in hiring. This part discusses the various
legal arguments that the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits have addressed in
their opinions.
Part IV contends that the purely textual approach to statutory
construction, which the majorities in the circuit court opinions favored, leads
to an absurdity in results. This part questions the plausibility that Congress
17

Id. at 3.
Id. at 22.
19
Erika McEntarfer, Older People Working Longer, Earning More, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Apr.
24, 2018), https://www.census.gov/library/stories/2018/04/aging-workforce.html.
20
Id.
21
Mitra Toossi & Elka Torpey, Older Workers: Labor Force Trends and Career Options, U.S.
BUREAU LAB. STAT. (May 2017), https://www.bls.gov/careeroutlook/2017/article/older-workers.htm.
The forty percent statistic is known as the labor force participation rate, which is also “expected to
increase fastest for the oldest segments of the population—most notably, people ages 65 to 74 and 75
and older—through 2024.” Id.
18
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intended to make the arbitrary distinction that these courts have read into a
minor difference in wording. Part IV also argues that the statutory language
can, and should, be read to allow for disparate impact claims by older job
applicants.
Part V recommends two different approaches to address this problem in
light of the current case law. The first is for advocates not to give up on other
circuits deciding this issue in a more favorable way. A favorable circuit court
decision would create a circuit split, likely giving rise to Supreme Court
review. The second is a congressional amendment to the ADEA, which
would eliminate any ambiguity and finally offer full protection to older
applicants in employment.
I. DISPARATE IMPACT FRAMEWORK AND THE ADEA
In the instance of older Americans, it is seldom the case that employers
are intentionally discriminating against them out of “dislike or intolerance,”
as can be found with cases of discrimination on the basis of “race, color,
religion, or national origin.”22 However, negative stereotypes and misplaced
assumptions about older individuals’ work ability are commonplace.23 Age
discrimination is based primarily upon unfounded assumptions about the
relationship between an individual’s age and his or her ability to perform a
job.24
But age discrimination does not have to be based on those stereotypical
assumptions in order to be considered unlawful. Certain job qualifications
might affect older workers more heavily, as a group, than they do younger
workers.25 For example, imagine an employer that has a policy of only hiring
individuals with less than five years of experience in their field. This hiring
policy is neutral on its face because younger workers and older workers alike
may have less than five years of experience in that certain field. However,
this policy disproportionately impacts older workers because it is more
likely that older workers, rather than younger workers, will have exceeded
that experience cap.
This Note is concerned with the types of arbitrary employment practices
that operate indirectly to restrict the employment of older workers in a
22

WIRTZ REPORT, supra note 1, at 5 (finding that there was no significant evidence of intentional
discrimination).
23
Thomas W.H. Ng & Daniel C. Feldman, Evaluating Six Common Stereotypes About Older
Workers with Meta-Analytical Data, 65 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 821, 826 (2012) (noting that “negative
stereotypes about aging are often socially constructed from observations of the declining health of very
old people who have long since retired . . . [and] [t]here is less evidence . . . that older workers who are
still actively employed are especially susceptible to health problems”).
24
WIRTZ REPORT, supra note 1, at 2.
25
See id. at 11–13 (listing examples of “certain circumstances which unquestionably affect older
workers more strongly, as a group, than they do younger workers” such as health, educational attainment,
and technological change).
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discriminatory manner. Discrimination in the employment of older
workers still exists in America and will continue to flourish until courts
interpret the ADEA to protect older workers from “employment practices
which . . . unintentionally lead to age limits in hiring.”27
Unlawful discrimination can take two different forms: disparate
treatment28 and disparate impact.29 A claimant can prove disparate treatment
by establishing that an employer treated him or her less favorably than
another worker of a different group and the individual’s protected
characteristic (such as race, sex, or age) was the reason for that differential
treatment, thereby making intent a crucial element.30 To prove disparate
impact, however, a plaintiff need only establish that a particular employment
practice has an adverse effect on workers of his or her group. This shifts the
burden to the defendant to show that the practice has a sufficiently strong
business justification.31 Therefore, proof of discriminatory motive is not
required under a disparate impact theory of liability.32
The Supreme Court has long recognized that both Title VII and the
ADEA cover disparate treatment.33 Disparate impact, on the other hand, has
had a more distinctive historical development in the law. The Supreme
Court, interpreting statutory language similar to that appearing in the ADEA,
first held disparate impact to be a violation of Title VII in 1971.34 However,
26

Id. at 5.
Id. at 22.
28
See, e.g., Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977) (“‘Disparate
treatment’ . . . is the most easily understood type of discrimination. The employer simply treats some
people less favorably than others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”); Hannah
Arterian Furnish, A Path Through the Maze: Disparate Impact and Disparate Treatment Under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 After Beazer and Burdine, 23 B.C. L. REV. 419, 419 (1982) (“In a disparate
treatment case, the plaintiff attempts to demonstrate that he is the victim of intentional, but covert,
discrimination.”).
29
See, e.g., Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335–36 n.15 (stating that disparate impact involves
“employment practices that are facially neutral in their treatment of different groups but that in fact fall
more harshly on one group than another and cannot be justified by business necessity”); Furnish, supra
note 28, at 419 (“In a disparate impact case the plaintiff attempts to demonstrate that a neutral rule, fair
on its face and objectively applied, has a significantly greater effect on persons protected under Title VII
than on the majority group.”).
30
Michael Evan Gold, Disparate Impact Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,
25 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 4 (2004). See also Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15 (“Proof of
discriminatory motive is critical . . . .”).
31
Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2514–15
(2015).
32
Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335–36 n.15.
33
See 29 U.S.C. § 623 (2012) (covering disparate treatment as a violation of the ADEA);
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (establishing a disparate treatment cause
of action under Title VII). See also Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 609 (1993) (“The disparate
treatment theory is of course available under the ADEA, as the language of the statute makes clear.”).
34
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 427–28 (1971) (prohibiting an employment policy that
required a high school education and passage of two aptitude tests which was disproportionately
disqualifying black applicants). “What is required by Congress is the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and
27
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after that, the Supreme Court declined to address the availability of disparate
impact under the ADEA for over thirty years.35 It was not until 2005 that the
Supreme Court held, for the first time, that the ADEA authorizes disparate
impact claims.36 The first case to do so, however, involved a claim from a
group of current employees,37 which left unanswered the question of
whether job applicants, in addition to current employees, could bring
disparate impact claims. Two circuit courts have considered this issue,38 but
the issue has yet to reach the Supreme Court.
Under the ADEA, proving a disparate impact claim is similar to, but in
some respects different from, doing so under Title VII. Title VII allows for
an affirmative defense from a claim of disparate impact if the employer can
prove that its practice is both “job related for the position in question and
consistent with business necessity.”39 For example, if an employer were to
implement a diploma and test requirement for employment or promotion, as
they did in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., the employer has the burden of
proving that those requirements “bear a demonstrable relationship to
successful performance of the jobs for which it was used.”40 If the
requirements operate to exclude a protected class, and they cannot be shown
to be related to job performance, then the requirements are prohibited.
However, the Supreme Court has held that the Title VII business
necessity test has “no place in ADEA disparate-impact cases.”41 Rather, the
ADEA prohibits practices that have a disparate impact unless the employer
can show that the practice is based on a reasonable factor other than age—
also known as the RFOA defense.42 The Supreme Court took into account
the ADEA’s distinct RFOA provision and found that Title VII had no “likeworded defense,”43 making it unique and controlling only in matters
involving the ADEA. The RFOA defense is “essentially that the employer
did not need to rely on age in a discriminatory manner, because it had other
unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of
racial or other impermissible classification.” Id. at 431.
35
Biggins, 507 U.S. at 610 (citations omitted) (“[W]e have never decided whether a disparate
impact theory of liability is available under the ADEA . . . and we need not do so here.”). Yet, lower
courts had applied disparate impact theory to the ADEA with some frequency. See cases cited infra note
128.
36
Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 232 (2005).
37
Id. at 231 (discussing that the petitioners were a group of older officers who claimed that their
employer had discriminated against them because of a pay plan that granted raises to all City employees
in a disproportionate manner).
38
The Eleventh Circuit in Villarreal II, 839 F.3d 958, 961 (11th Cir. 2016), and the Seventh Circuit
in Kleber II, 914 F.3d 480, 481 (7th Cir. 2019).
39
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2012).
40
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
41
Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab., 554 U.S. 84, 97 (2008).
42
Gold, supra note 30, at 55. See also Meacham, 544 U.S. at 97 (confirming that the RFOA
exemption is an affirmative defense).
43
Meacham, 554 U.S. at 100.
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valid [and reasonable] reasons for making the same decision, and therefore
it cannot be shown to have discriminated on the basis of age.”44 By allowing
such a defense, the Court has acknowledged that “certain employment
criteria that are routinely used may be reasonable despite their adverse
impact on older workers as a group.”45 To illustrate this point, an
employment policy that replaces a highly paid worker with a lower-paid
worker would likely have a disparate impact on older workers but would be
permissible under the RFOA defense because the practice is a reasonable
means to lower costs.
This “reasonable factors” defense is a more lenient standard of
justification than under the disparate treatment requirement in the ADEA,
which requires the employer to provide a bona fide occupational
qualification (also known as the BFOQ defense) to justify differential
treatment.46 Under the BFOQ defense, an employer may refuse to hire an
older worker based on his age if being younger is a bona fide occupational
qualification.47 For example, mandatory retirement age requirements for
airline pilots are allowed as a BFOQ because of proven safety concerns.48
The BFOQ defense requires an examination into whether there was an
alternative method that would not impact older workers and still achieve the
desired outcome, but the RFOA does not require this inquiry.
In establishing a prima facie case of disparate impact under the ADEA,
the plaintiff must (1) identify a specific employment policy or practice and
(2) establish that it harmed older workers substantially more than younger
workers with employment decisions made on the basis of the plaintiff’s
age.49 The burden of producing evidence and the burden of persuasion50 then
shift to the employer to establish that it relied on a factor other than age that
was designed and administered reasonably to achieve a legitimate business
purpose in light of the circumstances, including the potential harm to older
workers.51 If the employer can make such a showing, the plaintiff still has
the opportunity to show that the employer’s reasons are pretext for
discrimination, or that there is an alternative employment practice that does
not disparately impact older workers, which also serves the employer’s
legitimate interests.52
44

Evan H. Pontz, Comment, What a Difference ADEA Makes: Why Disparate Impact Theory
Should Not Apply to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 74 N.C. L. REV. 267, 275 (1995).
45
Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 241 (2005).
46
Gold, supra note 30, at 55, 62–63.
47
Id. at 55.
48
EEOC v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 560 F. App’x 282, 289 (5th Cir. 2014).
49
Pontz, supra note 44, at 284–85.
50
See Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab., 554 U.S. 84, 93 (2008) (explaining that the burden
of persuasion falls on the “one who claims its benefits”).
51
Pontz, supra note 44, at 285.
52
Id.

514

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:1

II. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
Courts employ a variety of approaches when interpreting statutes. They
generally look to the ordinary meaning of the text and the organizational
structure of the statute itself, as well as to the legislative purpose in enacting
the statute and the legislative history.53 Courts also often compare statutes
under their review with other statutes utilizing similar language to infer
similar, or different, meanings in congressional intent.54 Courts generally
begin with the statutory language, but when the ordinary language of the
statute has various viable readings, they regularly look to external factors
such as the legislative history and how the administrative agency tasked with
administering and enforcing the act interprets it.55 The next several sections
of this Note consider each of the various modes of interpretation and apply
them to the text and legislative history of the ADEA.
A. Analyzing the Text of the Statute
Courts commonly start their statutory interpretation by looking to the
ordinary meaning of the language used in the act, taken as a whole,56 to
discover the legislature’s original intent. Section 4(a) of the ADEA provides
in relevant part:
It shall be unlawful for an employer—
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or
otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to
his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual’s age;
53
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., INTERPRETING LAW: A PRIMER ON HOW TO READ STATUTES AND
CONSTITUTION 26 (2016). However, it is important to note that Justices on the Supreme Court
disagree on the relative weight to be given to these criteria. For example, Justice Breyer “has strongly
defended consideration of legislative history in order to discern the legislative intent.” Frank B. Cross,
The Significance of Statutory Interpretive Methodologies, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1971, 1974 (2007).
On the other hand, Justices Scalia and Kennedy have “explicitly rejected the validity of legislative
history” with Justice Stevens also cautioning its unreliability as a “guide to interpretation.” Id. at 1975.
Most famously and well known is the fact that Justices Gorsuch and the late Scalia “demonstrate a
commitment to textualism and originalism” meaning they believe they “must follow the text, as written,
without recourse to authorial or legislative intent.” Max Alderman & Duncan Pickard, Justice Scalia’s
Heir Apparent?: Judge Gorsuch’s Approach to Textualism and Originalism, 69 STAN. L. REV. 185, 186
(2017).
54
The ADEA is often compared to Title VII because of the similar language used by Congress in
these two statutes. See, e.g., Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 233 (2005) (noting the identical
language between the ADEA and Title VII and other parallel provisions in comparing the two statutes);
Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584 (1978) (stating that “the prohibitions of the ADEA were derived in
haec verba from Title VII” when comparing Title VII to the ADEA).
55
ESKRIDGE JR., supra note 53, at 422, 434 (discussing the legislative history rule and the
administrability canon in the Supreme Court’s interpretations of statutes).
56
Id. at 85.
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(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way
which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his
status as an employee, because of such individual’s age . . . .57
Courts have held section 4(a)(1) to be limited to claims of disparate
treatment because of its focus on taking discriminatory actions “because of
such individual’s age,” thereby requiring proof of intentional
discrimination.58 Courts have held section 4(a)(2), in contrast, to encompass
disparate impact discrimination as well as overt age-based actions.59
In analyzing the language of section 4(a)(2), courts have grappled with
how to interpret several terms. One ambiguous term in section 4(a)(2) that
the Supreme Court has examined is the meaning of “age.”60 The phrase
“because of an individual’s age” could be interpreted broadly to include
claims by both younger and older individuals.61 However, in General
Dynamics Land System v. Cline, the Supreme Court concluded that a
“narrower reading is the more natural one in the textual setting”62 and held
that the ADEA does not stop employers from “favoring an older employee
over a younger one.”63 The Court, considering the structure and purpose of
the ADEA, reasoned that Congress designed the statute to “manifestly . . .
protect the older from arbitrary favor [of] the younger.”64 The Court also
looked to precedent, which had not directly addressed the question at issue,
but reflected a consistent understanding that the ADEA is a remedy for
“unfair preference based on relative youth.”65 The Cline case helps illustrate
that courts must assess ambiguous terms with multiple meanings in light of
the ADEA’s context, structure, purpose, and history.
The Court has also considered the meaning of the term “employees.”66
Section 4(a)(2) prohibits limiting, segregating, or classifying “employees”
based on their ages.67 On the surface, the term “employees” seems to refer
merely to those individuals that currently have an existing employment
57

29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1)–(2) (2016).
Smith, 544 U.S. at 236 n.6 (discussing the differing treatment of motive between section 4(a)(1)
and 4(a)(2), concluding that section 4(a)(1) focuses on the employer’s discriminatory motives, therefore
authorizing disparate treatment claims).
59
Id. at 236 (concluding that section 4(a)(2) “focuses on the effects of the action on the employee
rather than the motivation for the action of the employer”).
60
Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 584 (2004) (determining whether the
ADEA prohibits favoring the old over the young in addition to preference for the young over the old).
61
Id. at 586 (agreeing “[i]n the abstract, [that] the phrase is open to an argument for a broader
construction, since reference to ‘age’ carries no modifier and the word could be read to look two ways”).
62
Id. at 598.
63
Id. at 600.
64
Id.
65
Id. at 593.
66
Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997).
67
29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2) (2012).
58
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relationship with an employer. However, in a case involving the claim of a
former employee, the Supreme Court held that the term “employees,” as
used in a comparable provision in Title VII, was ambiguous.68 The
complainant brought a suit against his former employer alleging that
postemployment actions were taken to retaliate against him for a different
claim he had filed.69 The Supreme Court took up the question of whether the
term “employees” was limited to current employees or could include former
employees.70 The Court held that the term, “employees,” “standing alone[,]
is necessarily ambiguous.”71 It then considered “whether the context gives
the term a further meaning that would resolve the issue in dispute.”72 The
Court concluded that extending coverage to former employees was
consistent with the broader context and primary purpose of Title VII,
because of “several sections of the statute [that] plainly contemplate that
former employees will make use of the remedial mechanisms of Title VII.”73
Since the term “employees” has been held to be ambiguous in Title VII’s
comparable statutory language, similarly in section 4(a)(2) of the ADEA the
term “employees” need not only be taken to be limited to current employees,
but rather it could also extend to include prospective employees such as
applicants for employment.
However, even if the term “employees” in section 4(a)(2) of the ADEA,
standing alone, is taken to mean solely current employees of the defendant
employer, section 4(a)(2) could still apply to applicants because of the
interplay of the term “employees” with the phrase “any individual.” An
employer that has experience caps in hiring illustrates this point. The
employer in this example is, in essence, classifying its employees within the
meaning of section 4(a)(2) of the ADEA because it will only hire employees
with less than the prescribed experience requirement. Therefore, even in
taking “employees” to mean current employees of the defendant employer,
section 4(a)(2) could still apply to applicants because by denying an older,
more experienced applicant employment, it is essentially limiting and
classifying its employees in a way that deprives “any individual of
employment opportunities.”74 Job applicants are among the “any
individuals” who are deprived of employment opportunities by this
employer’s limitation of employees.

68

Robinson, 519 U.S. at 341.
Id. at 339.
70
Id.
71
Id. at 343.
72
Id. at 344.
73
Id. at 345. The Court noted section 703(a) as one such section that “includes discriminatory
‘discharge’ as one of the unlawful employment practices against which Title VII is directed.” Id.
74
29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2) (2012).
69
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B. Comparison of Section 4(a)(2) with Other Sections of the ADEA
An analysis of the ADEA section 4(a)(2), which looks to the textual
differences between this section and other sections of the ADEA and
comparable provisions in other statutes, also reaches inconclusive results.
This Note breaks down each textual argument both in favor of, and opposed
to, the availability of a disparate impact claim for applicants and
demonstrates that courts should not put too much weight on the use of any
one textual phrase.
In section 4(a)(1), which clearly applies the disparate treatment
prohibition to job applicants because of its explicit listing of “refuse to hire”
as a covered employment action, Congress uses the phrase “any individual”
twice: “It shall be unlawful for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to
discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual . .
. because of such individual’s age.”75 Congress also chose to use the same
expansive “any individual” language in section 4(a)(2) instead of specifying
“any employee,”76 which it easily could have done. This can lead courts
interpreting the statute to reasonably conclude that “any individual,” when
used in both sections 4(a)(1) and 4(a)(2), means the same thing—applying
to both employees and applicants.77
The counterargument is that Congress could have used the phrase “any
individual” twice in section 4(a)(2) like it did in 4(a)(1), yet it intentionally
chose not to. But this argument is inconclusive; one could just as well say
that Congress could have used the term “employees” twice to eliminate this
ambiguity, yet it intentionally chose to include the more expansive “any
individual” language. Therefore, these countervailing arguments negate the
inference that the word choice signals anything meaningful about
congressional intent.
The only section of the ADEA that does not use the phrase “any
individual” is section 4(a)(3).78 Section 4(a)(3) makes it unlawful for an
employer to “reduce the wage rate of any employee.”79 The American
Association of Retired People (AARP),80 which has filed numerous amicus
75

Id. § 623(a)(1) (emphasis added).
Nicholas Piacente, No Prior Experience Desired: Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. and
the Scope of Disparate Impact Claims Under the ADEA, 91 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1005, 1018 (2017).
77
ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS
170 (2012) (“[W]here a word has a clear and definite meaning when used in one part of a . . . document,
but has not when used in another, the presumption is that the word is intended to have the same meaning
in the latter as in the former part.”).
78
Brief for the AARP as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellant at 7, Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co., 806 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2015) (No. 15-10602) [hereinafter Brief for the AARP].
79
29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(3) (2018).
80
“[The] AARP is a nonprofit, nonpartisan organization with a membership of nearly 38 million .
. . .” AARP, 2017 AARP ANNUAL REPORT 37 (2017). When an individual reaches the age of fifty, they
receive in the mail the dreaded solicitation for membership in the AARP—a symbol of inevitable aging.
76
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curiae briefs to advocate for older workers’ right to pursue disparate impact
claims,81 stated the argument aptly: “Section 4(a)(3) demonstrates that
Congress knew how to limit a prohibited practice to current employees by
using only the term ‘employees’ and not the broader term ‘any individual’
in the textual description of the prohibited practice.”82
This suggests that Congress would have used the phrase “any employee”
and not “any individual,” if it wanted section 4(a)(2) to only apply to
employees, not applicants. Since Congress did not, the argument is that “any
individual” should apply broadly to include applicants for employment.
However, a strong counterargument is that other provisions of the
ADEA specify both applicants and employees, indicating that Congress
knew how to reference job applicants but intentionally chose not to do so in
the disparate impact portion.83 Section 4(c)(2) makes it unlawful for a labor
organization to adversely affect an individual’s status as an “employee or as
an applicant for employment” because of an individual’s age.84 Section 4(d)
is the portion that prohibits retaliation against any of the employer’s
“employees or applicants for employment.”85 These provisions of the ADEA
both explicitly specify employees and applicants, which supports an
inference that Congress would have added “or applicants for employment”
if it intended to cover applicants. This inference becomes stronger when
Congress used the omitted phrase in “close proximity,”86 and these
provisions follow shortly after section 4(a)(2).
The question then becomes whether the absence of this phrase in section
(a)(2) is meaningful. In answering that question, courts have considered
“whether Congress intended its different words to make a legal
difference.”87 However, courts are reluctant to draw significance from

But with that membership also come undeniably valuable benefits. Among those benefits is the AARP’s
vigorous advocacy for its members’ interests, including helping older workers overcome obstacles in the
workplace. Brief for the AARP, supra note 78, at 1. The AARP has been around and involved in this
issue from the beginning. AARP History, AARP (May 10, 2010), https://www.aarp.org/aboutaarp/company/info-2016/history.html (documenting that the AARP was founded in 1958, having
evolved from the National Retired Teachers Association, which had been established since 1947). It has
also been conducting legal advocacy to advance the legal rights and interests of people fifty and older
through its AARP Foundation Litigation (AFL). AARP Foundation Legal Advocacy, AARP FOUND.,
https://www.aarp.org/aarp-foundation/our-work/legal-advocacy/?intcmp=FTR-LINKS-FOU-LEGALEWHERE (last visited Mar. 13, 2019).
81
Brief for the AARP, supra note 78, at 2 (citing Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228 (2005),
as a landmark case in which the AARP filed an amicus curiae brief).
82
Id. at 7.
83
Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Maclean, 135 S. Ct. 913, 919 (2015) (“Congress generally acts
intentionally when it uses particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another.”).
84
29 U.S.C. § 623(c)(2) (2012).
85
Id. § 623(d)(2).
86
Maclean, 135 S. Ct. at 919.
87
Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 62–63 (2006).
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differences in wording between provisions that differ in scope. Section 4(c)
covers labor organizations, which protect the combined interests of workers
by collective bargaining with their employers.89 Labor organizations do not
directly hire or fire an employer’s employees, making the purpose and scope
of section 4(c) vastly different than that of section 4(a), which only applies
to employers. Section 4(d) creates a retaliation protection, which prohibits
employers from taking adverse action against an employee or applicant
engaged in a protected activity, such as opposing an unlawful practice.90 The
retaliation coverage is not determined by claims of disparate treatment or
disparate impact based on age. Anyone who speaks out against unlawful
discrimination is covered by the retaliation provision, making section 4(d)
significantly different in scope from section 4(a).
The arguments on both sides of the textual analysis further evidence that
we should not put too much weight in the use of the terms “employee” and
“any individual” in section 4(a)(2) to try to glean the congressional intent.
As explained below, despite the absence of express language implicating
applicants in section (a)(2), there is strong reason to believe that Congress
intended to cover applicants. A comparison with the language in Title VII
helps illuminate this intent.
C. Comparison of the ADEA with Title VII
Since Congress passed the ADEA soon after the passage of Title VII,
and because much of the language is similar, courts often compare the
language between the two. Section 703(a)(2) of Title VII is the relevant
provision that applies to disparate impact claims. It provides in relevant part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer—
...
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants
for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to
deprive any individual of employment opportunities or
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because
of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.91
The clear discrepancy between the current disparate impact provisions
in Title VII and the ADEA could be read to imply that the ADEA only
88

See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 355–56 (2013) (finding a fundamental
difference in statutory scope between the provisions of section 2000e-2(m) and Title IX, sections 1981
and 1982 and several provisions of the ADEA and therefore declining to draw inferences from differences
between them).
89
29 U.S.C. § 623(c) (2012).
90
Id. § 623(d).
91
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012).
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explicitly applies to “employees,” whereas Title VII applies to either
“employees or applicants for employment.” Before 1972, however, the
relevant portion of Title VII was virtually identical to that of the ADEA.92
The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 amended Title VII to add
“or applicants for employment” to the language that parallels the ADEA
section (4)(a)(2).93
The amendment of Title VII has been used to argue that ADEA disparate
impact claims should not extend to applicants. The argument goes: it is
presumed that Congress acted intentionally by specifically choosing to
change Title VII, yet failing to make the same change to the ADEA.94 The
Supreme Court employed this analysis when considering whether the ADEA
permitted mixed motive liability or required but-for causation in Gross v.
FBL Financial Services, Inc.95 In that case, the Court refused to apply Title
VII decisions that had established a “motivating factor” test for disparate
treatment claims to the interpretation of the ADEA because Congress had
amended Title VII to expressly include that standard, but had intentionally
decided not to amend the ADEA in a similar way.96
The problem with this argument, however, is that, at the time of the
amendment of Title VII that added “or applicants for employment” to
section 703(a)(2), there was no reason for Congress to look at the
comparable provision in the ADEA. The 1972 Equal Employment
Opportunity Act exclusively addressed Title VII. There were no proposed
amendments to the ADEA in front of Congress at the time.97 In contrast,
when Title VII was amended to add the motivating factor language in 1991,
the ADEA was also “contemporaneously amended . . . in several ways.”98
Therefore, the argument that we should draw an inference from the fact that
Congress did not amend the ADEA at the same time it amended Title VII is
attenuated because the ADEA was not before the legislature at the time.
Further, the conference committee report to the Senate stated that the
addition of “applicants for employment” to Title VII was intended “to make
it clear that discrimination against applicants for employment . . . is an
unlawful employment practice” and the additional language was “merely
92
Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 233 (2005) (“Except for substitution of the word ‘age’
for the words ‘race, color, religion, sex, or national origin,’ the language of that provision in the ADEA
is identical to that found in § 703(a)(2) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII).”).
93
Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 8(a), 86 Stat. 109 (1972).
94
Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., 557 U.S. 167, 174 (2009).
95
Id. at 173.
96
Id. at 175.
97
ADEA and Amendments, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/history/adea50th/adea.cfm (last visited Mar. 13, 2019) (listing the
amendments to the ADEA, with the first amendment after its passage in 1967 being in 1974—two years
after the amendment to Title VII).
98
Gross, 557 U.S. at 174.
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declaratory of present laws.” This signals that the amendment was not
necessary in order for the prior language, which mirrors that of the ADEA,
to apply to applicants.100 Congress was merely making it explicitly clear,
reiterating what courts had already decided—that the disparate impact
language of Title VII covered applicants for employment.
In early cases that established disparate impact liability under the
ADEA, courts presumed that Congress intended the text to have the same
meaning in both Title VII and the ADEA.101 In Griggs v. Duke Power, the
Supreme Court interpreted the language of section 703(a)(2) of Title VII
prior to its amendment, making it a reliable reading of how to interpret the
nearly identical language that appeared in the ADEA.102 The Court in Griggs
held that the same language contained in the ADEA included disparate
impact protection for both current employees and job seekers.103 The
Supreme Court has applied the authoritative construction of identical
statutory language in Griggs as controlling when interpreting section 4(a)(2)
of the ADEA.104 In Smith v. City of Jackson, the Court held that Griggs’s
conclusion that section 703(a)(2) of Title VII allows for disparate impact
claims “strongly suggests that a disparate-impact theory should be
cognizable under the ADEA.”105
Recently, the Supreme Court, in Texas Department of Housing &
Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities, held that Griggs and other
cases interpreting Title VII and the ADEA provided essential background
and instruction in interpreting the Fair Housing Act (FHA), even though its
wording differed from section 703(a)(2) of Title VII.106 This provides further
support for the use of Griggs, which was interpreting Title VII, to interpret
other statutes, including the ADEA, despite minor textual differences in the
statutes. In Inclusive Communities, the Court looked to the three statutes—
the FHA, Title VII, and the ADEA—and concluded that despite differences
in language, “Congress . . . chose words that serve the same purpose and
bear the same basic meaning . . . .”107 Therefore, a comparison of Title VII
99

118 CONG. REC. 7166, 7169 (Mar. 6, 1972).
See Rabin v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP, 236 F. Supp. 3d 1126, 1131 (2017) (finding the
amendment to Title VII “signaled that Griggs had properly interpreted Title VII as protecting both
employees and applicants. Therefore, the amendment supports, rather than detracts from, an
interpretation of the ADEA as likewise covering both employees and applicants”).
101
Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 233 (2005).
102
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 426 n.1 (1971).
103
Id. at 430–31. See also Kleber II, 914 F.3d 480, 496 (7th Cir. 2019) (Hamilton, J., dissenting)
(discussing how to follow the interpretation used in Griggs in ADEA cases).
104
See, e.g., Smith, 544 U.S. at 233–34 (describing the Griggs analysis as it applies to the ADEA);
Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2517 (2015)
(citing the ADEA as a “relevant statute that bears on the proper interpretation of the FHA”).
105
Smith, 544 U.S. at 236.
106
Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2518.
107
Id. at 2519.
100
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to the ADEA demonstrates that the lack of any reference to “applicants” in
the ADEA is not dispositive. It certainly does not support the inference that
Congress intended, by that omission, to keep disparate impact claims
unavailable to applicants.
D. Legislative History and Intent
When there is ambiguity in the statutory text, courts often look to
legislative history for clarification.108 In the findings and purpose section of
the ADEA, Congress declared that “older workers find themselves
disadvantaged . . . especially to regain employment when displaced from
jobs . . . .”109 Further, Congress stated that it was the “purpose of this chapter
to promote employment of older persons based on their ability rather than
age; to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment . . . .”110 These
declarations indicate that Congress intended the statute to cover age
discrimination against more than just employees, but also to extend
protection to older applicants.111
Outside the statutory text, Congress’s intent is apparent from the
Department of Labor’s Wirtz Report.112 Prior to the enactment of the ADEA,
Congress had directed the Department to study and report on factors that
might result in discrimination in employment because of age and the
consequences of such discrimination.113 In its findings, the Report described
how specific age limits in hiring are one of the most obvious types of age
discrimination in employment.114 Significantly, the Report also addressed
employment practices that have a disparate impact, stating that it would be
necessary “not only to deal with overt acts of discrimination, but also to
adjust those present employment practices which quite unintentionally lead
to age limits in hiring.”115
The Report recommended age discrimination legislation, which
provided the initiative for the passage of the ADEA.116 The ADEA’s
statement of findings and purpose incorporates several of the Department of
108

See ESKRIDGE JR., supra note 53, at 198 (“For more than a century, federal judges have been
willing to consider legislative history.”).
109
29 U.S.C. § 621(a)(1) (2012).
110
Id. § 621(b).
111
Senator Ralph Yarborough, the chief sponsor of the ADEA in the Senate, stated “[i]n simple
terms, this bill prohibits discrimination in hiring and firing workers.” 113 CONG. REC. 31,248, 31,252
(1967).
112
In this report, W. Willard Wirtz called age discrimination the “most deserving and much
neglected cause” hoping that the report would “provide the impetus for effective measures.” WIRTZ
REPORT, supra note 1, at ii.
113
Michael C. Harper, ADEA Doctrinal Impediments to the Fulfillment of the Wirtz Report Agenda,
31 U. RICH. L. REV. 757, 758 (1997).
114
WIRTZ REPORT, supra note 1, at 6.
115
Id. at 22.
116
Harper, supra note 113, at 762.
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Labor’s goals and the reasoning in the Wirtz Report, which supports the
connection between the Report and the ADEA when analyzing
congressional intent.117 The Supreme Court has also relied repeatedly on the
Wirtz Report to interpret the ADEA.118 In fact, in Cline, the Court even went
so far as to use the Wirtz Report to conclude that the ADEA did not cover
discrimination in favor of older workers, despite statutory language that
could support that reading. The Court held that “[t]he ADEA’s ban on
‘arbitrary limits’ thus applies to age caps that exclude older applicants,
necessarily to the advantage of younger ones,” citing the Wirtz Report as
evidence that the intent behind the statute was to protect older applicants.119
The Wirtz Report and the statutory purpose articulated in the findings
and purpose sections of the ADEA indicate that Congress enacted the ADEA
to address discriminatory barriers in the hiring of older workers and intended
for the ADEA to protect older prospective job applicants, not just current
employees, from practices having a disparate impact.
E. EEOC Interpretations
If, even after looking at the ordinary meaning of the text and the
legislative history, the statute is still ambiguous, courts may then consider
interpretations from the agency charged with enforcing the statute, which
has the authority to interpret the statute through rulemaking or
adjudication.120 Courts will uphold agency regulations that interpret
ambiguous statutory terms, as long as they are reasonable.121 This is known
as Chevron deference, which is granted to administrative interpretations
when Congress has delegated authority to the agency to make rules carrying
the force of law.122 The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
117
Id. See also Kleber II, 914 F.3d 480, 487–88 (7th Cir. 2019) (“Nobody disputes that the Wirtz
Report reinforces Congress’s clear aim of enacting the ADEA to prevent age discrimination in the
workplace by encouraging the employment of older persons, including older job applicants.”).
118
See, e.g., Smith v. Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 254 (2005) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (stating that
“the ADEA was modeled on the Wirtz Report’s findings and recommendations,” so “the Report provides
critical insights into the statute’s meaning”); Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 590
(2004) (noting the “unmistakable references to the Wirtz Report’s finding[s]” in the ADEA).
119
Cline, 540 U.S. at 590.
120
See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984) (“[T]here
is an express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by
regulation. Such legislative regulations are given controlling weight . . . .”); see also United States v.
Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001) (recognizing that “express congressional authorizations to engage
in the process of rulemaking or adjudication that produces regulations or rulings” is a good indicator of
delegation meriting deference by the courts).
121
See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844 (stating that such “regulations are given controlling weight unless
they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute”); see also EEOC v. Commercial
Office Prods. Co., 486 U.S. 107, 115 (1988) (“[T]he EEOC’s interpretation of ambiguous language need
only be reasonable to be entitled to deference.”).
122
Mead, 533 U.S. at 226–27. It is worth acknowledging that the use of Chevron deference has
been contested and the doctrine significantly narrowed by Supreme Court opinions over the years. See,
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(EEOC) enforces the ADEA, and Congress has expressly delegated the
authority to issue rules to effectuate the statute to it.123 Therefore, courts are
compelled to defer to reasonable EEOC rules when addressing the meaning
of ambiguous statutory language in the ADEA.124
The EEOC has issued a disparate impact regulation that states: “Any
employment practice that adversely affects individuals within the protected
age group on the basis of older age is discriminatory unless the practice is
justified by a ‘reasonable factor other than age.’”125 By utilizing the word
“individuals,” the EEOC effectively did not distinguish between prospective
and existing employees. Some courts have discussed the regulation as
grounds for treating section 4(a)(2) of the ADEA as “covering
disparate-impact claims . . . and thus protect[ing] applicants for
employment.”126 Since the EEOC, the agency charged with enforcing the
ADEA, has reasonably and consistently interpreted the statute to allow for
disparate impact claims by job applicants, this interpretation provides yet
another reason for courts to conclude that the ambiguous statutory language
should be read to authorize disparate impact claims by applicants.

e.g., Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2121 (2018) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (calling for
reconsideration of the “premises that underlie Chevron and how courts have implemented that decision”);
Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712–13 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting that the Chevron
deference doctrine allows for “potentially unconstitutional delegations” because of its encroachment on
judicial powers and consideration of agency policymaking); Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142,
1152 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“Chevron seems no less than a judge-made doctrine for
the abdication of the judicial duty.”).
123
29 U.S.C. § 628 (2012) (“[T]he Equal Employment Opportunity Commission may issue such
rules and regulations as it may consider necessary or appropriate for carrying out this chapter . . . .”).
124
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844 (“We have long recognized that considerable weight should be
accorded to an executive department’s construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer,
and the principle of deference to administrative interpretations . . . .”). However, when the delegation of
rulemaking is not clear from the empowering statute, courts apply Skidmore deference. Theodore W.
Wern, Judicial Deference to the EEOC Interpretations of the Civil Rights Act, the ADA, and the ADEA:
Is the EEOC a Second Class Agency?, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1533, 1539–40 (1999). The EEOC is entitled to
Chevron deference for interpretations and regulations based on the ADEA. See Smith v. City of Jackson,
544 U.S. 228, 245 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that “the EEOC’s reasonable view that the
ADEA authorizes disparate-impact claims is deserving of” Chevron deference). This is because Congress
explicitly delegated to the EEOC the authority to promulgate rules with the force of law. 29 U.S.C. § 628
(2012). However, the EEOC has only been held to have Skidmore deference for interpretations of Title
VII. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141 (1976), reh’g denied, 429 U.S. 1079 (1977). This is
because the EEOC was not granted the authority to promulgate rules with the force of law under Title
VII. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(a) (2012) (granting the EEOC only the authority to issue “suitable
procedural regulations” for Title VII).
125
29 C.F.R. § 1625.7(c) (2012). See also 29 C.F.R. pt. 1625 (1981) (tracing the history of the
predecessor regulation which shows that the regulation has been the same for over thirty years).
126
Kleber II, 914 F.3d 480, 504 (7th Cir. 2019) (Hamilton, J., dissenting) (citing Smith, 544 U.S. at
266); see also Villarreal I, 806 F.3d 1288, 1299 (11th Cir. 2015) (discussing the EEOC’s ADEA disparate
impact regulation as extending liability to all individuals within the protected age group and noting that
the court “owe[s] deference to the EEOC’s view”).
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III. CURRENT CASE LAW: DISPARATE IMPACT CLAIMS UNDER THE ADEA
From when Congress enacted the ADEA in 1967 to 2015, no court had
addressed the question, outside of dicta, whether applicants could bring
disparate impact claims under the ADEA.127 However, over the years, courts
have applied disparate impact to claims by applicants without raising the
issue, but assuming that it applied.128 In 2015, the Eleventh Circuit in
Villarreal was the first court to address, as an issue of first impression,
whether section 4(a)(2) of the ADEA authorizes disparate impact claims by
applicants for employment.129 A few years later, in 2018, the Seventh Circuit
followed suit in Kleber.130
A. Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.
1. Background
Richard Villarreal applied for a sales position at R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
when he was forty-nine years old.131 However, R.J. Reynolds had a
recruiting system that targeted candidates two to three years out of college
and steered away from applicants that had eight to ten years of prior sales
experience. 132 Therefore, Villarreal’s application was effectively screened
out of the process, although R.J. Reynolds never responded to the
application and did not inform Villarreal of his rejection.133 Two years later,
lawyers contacted Villarreal and told him that he had a viable claim of age
discrimination against R.J. Reynolds.134 Villarreal then filed a charge with
the EEOC and applied for the same position five more times, for which he
was rejected by R.J. Reynolds every time.135 Statistics showed that R.J.
Reynolds had a history of hiring younger applicants.136 So, Villarreal
brought a lawsuit on behalf of himself and other applicants over the age of
forty who R.J. Reynolds also rejected for the position, alleging claims of

127

Brice Smallwood, Extending Disparate Impact Coverage of the ADEA to Applicants: Villarreal
v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 85 U. CIN. L. REV. 473, 479 (2017).
128
See, e.g., Katz v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 229 F.3d 831, 835 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[I]n this
circuit, disparate impact claims are cognizable under the ADEA.”); Smith v. City of Des Moines, 99 F.3d
1466, 1470 (8th Cir. 1997) (stating that disparate impact claims under the ADEA were cognizable);
Geller v. Markham, 635 F.2d 1027, 1030 (2d Cir. 1980) (finding that the plaintiff had been subjected to
a hiring practice with discriminatory impact which “may be applied in ADEA cases”).
129
Villarreal I, 806 F.3d at 1290.
130
Kleber I, 888 F.3d 868, 872 (7th Cir. 2018).
131
Villarreal II, 839 F.3d 958, 961 (11th Cir. 2016).
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disparate treatment and disparate impact. The district court dismissed the
disparate impact claim, and Villarreal appealed.138
2. Villarreal I
When an Eleventh Circuit panel heard the case for the first time on
appeal, it “construe[d] § 4(a)(2) of the ADEA to apply to disappointed job
applicants like Mr. Villarreal.”139 Its analysis started with the ordinary
language of the statute, looking to Mr. Villarreal’s and R.J. Reynolds’s
contrary interpretations of the statutory language.140 But because both
readings seemed “reasonable,”141 the Eleventh Circuit then analyzed the
EEOC’s reading.142
The court determined that the EEOC’s regulation “established the
agency’s view that § 4(a)(2) protects any individual an employer
discriminates against, regardless of whether that individual is an employee
or job applicant.”143 The court noted that the preamble to the EEOC’s
regulation makes it clear that its choice of the term “individuals” covered
both employees and applicants.144 The court also looked to the Department
of Labor, the agency that had been tasked with enforcement of the ADEA
before the EEOC, which had “clarified that neutral ‘pre-employment’ tests
must be . . . ‘equally applied to all applicants.’”145 The EEOC’s subsequent
regulation affirmed this longstanding position.146 Therefore, the Eleventh
Circuit found the EEOC’s interpretation to be reasonable and deserving of
deference147 and held that the ADEA’s protection against disparate impact
discrimination applies to applicants.148 However, that holding did not remain
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Villarreal II, 839 F.3d at 961–62.
Smallwood, supra note 127, at 480 (“Like the Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits, the district
court dismissed his disparate impact claim under the theory that only current employees could bring
disparate impact claims.”).
139
Villarreal I, 806 F.3d 1288, 1303 (11th Cir. 2015).
140
“Mr. Villarreal reads § 4(a)(2) to plainly cover his allegations. . . . He says RJ Reynolds ‘limited’
its ‘employees’ in a ‘way which would deprive or tend to deprive’ an ‘individual’ like him ‘of
employment opportunities’ because of his age.” Id. at 1293. “RJ Reynolds, in turn, directs us to the earlier
term ‘his employees.’ It says the later reference to ‘any individual’ only includes these employees.” Id.
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Id. at 1293.
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Id. at 1299.
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Id.
144
Id. at 1301. The preamble lists “a number of examples of cases involving job applicants” and
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workers.’” Id.
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Id. at 1302.
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for long—R.J. Reynolds petitioned for a rehearing en banc, which the court
granted.149
3. Villarreal II
The en banc Eleventh Circuit overturned the panel’s decision, divided
eight-to-three, holding that the ADEA does not protect applicants for
employment under a disparate impact theory of liability.150 The court
concluded that the plain text of section 4(a)(2) only covered discrimination
against employees, not applicants for employment.151 It came to this
conclusion through a textual analysis that emphasized the phrase “or
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee”152 in section 4(a)(2),
which states that it is unlawful for an employer “to limit, segregate, or
classify his employees in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive
any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect
his status as an employee, because of such individual’s age.”153 The court
held that this phrase made the first action, “deprive or tend to deprive,” a
subset of the second action, “adversely affect his status as an employee,”154
meaning an individual is only protected if he has a status as an employee. It
then invoked statutory context to confirm its reading of the section by
contrasting section 4(a)(2), which omits any reference to job applicants, with
other parallel provisions that expressly reference applicants as well as
employees.155 The Eleventh Circuit refused to consider the legislative
history or to defer to the EEOC’s interpretation of the statute since it found
the text to be clear.156
Judge Martin, writing for the dissent, stated “the majority’s holding[] in
this case do[es] harm to this court’s precedent and to the nation’s antidiscrimination laws.”157 The dissent contended that the plain text of the
ADEA, agency interpretations, and the landmark decision of Griggs all point
to reaching an opposite conclusion than the majority.158 Since the dissent did
not prevail, Mr. Villarreal petitioned the United States Supreme Court,
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which eventually denied certiorari. No other circuit court addressed the
issue until the Seventh Circuit in Kleber.
B. Kleber v. CareFusion
1. Background
Dale Kleber, a fifty-eight-year-old attorney, was actively looking for a
job after his previous employment ended in 2011.160 He had extensive legal
and business experience and applied to more than 150 positions without any
success.161 After a few years, he applied for the senior counsel position with
CareFusion Corporation.162 The job posting listed several requirements
suitable to Kleber’s experience.163 This posting, however, dictated that
applicants must have only three to seven years of relevant legal experience,
and not more than seven years.164 CareFusion did not select Kleber for an
interview and filled the position with a twenty-nine-year-old.165 Kleber filed
suit claiming disparate treatment and disparate impact, alleging the seven
years maximum experience cap had a disparate impact on qualified
applicants over the age of forty, like himself.166
2. Kleber I
Similar to Villarreal I, the Seventh Circuit panel that decided Kleber I
held that the language of the ADEA did not bar a disparate impact claim for
applicants.167 The court stated that “protect[ing] both outside job applicants
and current employees . . . is the better reading of the statutory text.”168 It
cited the purpose of the ADEA, previous case law, and similar language
from other employment discrimination statutes, such as the “virtually
identical statutory language in Title VII,” as support for holding in favor of
protecting job applicants from disparate impact employment discrimination
in hiring.169
159

Villarreal II, 839 F.3d 958 (11th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2292 (2017).
Kleber I, 888 F.3d 868, 871 (7th Cir. 2018).
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Id. The district court dismissed the disparate impact claim relying on a previous Seventh Circuit
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The panel began its analysis with the statutory language and the “overall
statutory scheme” of the ADEA.170 The court held that although section
4(a)(2) does not refer specifically to applicants or hiring decisions, its “broad
language easily reaches employment practices that hurt older job applicants
as well as current employees.”171 It explained that “[i]f an employer
classifies a position as one that must be filled by someone with certain
minimum or maximum experience requirements, it is classifying its
employees,”172 and job applicants who are disqualified as a result are also
“individual[s]” deprived of employment opportunities by this classification
of employees. Looking specifically at the “status as an employee” language,
the court maintained:
[I]f Congress really meant to outlaw employment practices
that tend to deprive older workers of employment
opportunities, which it did, but at the same time deliberately
chose to leave a wide array of discriminatory hiring practices
untouched, its use of the phrase “status as an employee” would
have been a remarkably indirect and even backhanded way to
express that meaning.173
Additionally, the Seventh Circuit panel considered what the outcome
would be if it were to hold that disparate impact liability was not available
for outside job applicants, calling the result “arbitrary and even baffling.”174
The court illustrated this unfairness by supposing that there were two
applicants for the CareFusion position—both were in their fifties with more
than seven years of experience. However, one of the applicants, like Kleber,
did not currently have a job at CareFusion and the other applicant was a
current employee which had applied for the job as a transfer or promotion.
In this situation, only the applicant who already worked for CareFusion
could sue for disparate impact violation, but the external applicant could
not.175 The court concluded that it could not “imagine a plausible policy
reason for drawing that arbitrary line” between inside and outside applicants
of an employer.176
However, the Seventh Circuit, similar to the Eleventh Circuit in
Villarreal I, granted a motion for rehearing en banc in Kleber,177 vacating
the panel’s initial decision.
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3. Kleber II Majority Opinion
Upon rehearing, the en banc panel was divided eight-to-four178 when it
held that the “plain language of § 4(a)(2) makes clear that Congress, while
protecting employees from disparate impact age discrimination, did not
extend that same protection to outside job applicants.”179 The en banc court
based its conclusion on the plain language of the ADEA, reinforced by “the
ADEA’s broader structure and history.”180
In its plain language analysis, the Seventh Circuit found that common
dictionary definitions of “applicants” and “employees” confirmed that
applicants have no “status as an employee.”181 Moreover, the court
interpreted Congress’s word choice in the “or otherwise” clause as a catchall
formulation extending “employee” to the rest of the sentence.182 This
grammatical construction connects the “any individual” language to “status
as an employee,” limiting the section, in the court’s opinion, to employees.183
The court also made the comparison to other provisions of the ADEA that
distinguish between employees and applicants, drawing the conclusion that
because section 4(a)(2) only mentions employees and not applicants,
Congress only authorized employees to bring disparate impact claims.184
The Seventh Circuit declined to resolve the question presented on the
basis of statutory purpose or legislative history, stating that it would not use
“an interpretation of but one provision of the ADEA . . . to advance the
enactment’s full objectives.”185 The court concluded its responsibility was
to interpret section 4(a)(2) as it stands, based solely on its plain meaning.186
Overall, the court felt it “le[ft] teeth in § 4(a)(2)”187 because although its
decision was unfavorable to Kleber, it still protects older employees who
encounter age-based disparate impact discrimination in the workplace.
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Kleber II, 914 F.3d 480, 480–81 (7th Cir. 2019).
Id. at 481.
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Id. at 482 (citing MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 60, 408 (11th ed. 2003),
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4. Kleber II Dissent
Four judges dissented from the outcome in Kleber II.188 Judge Hamilton,
writing in an opinion much longer than the majority’s, dissented based on
the reading of the statutory text and a comparison to Title VII’s disparate
impact provision, which protects both current employees and job-seekers.189
Hamilton advocated for a reading that would better align with the purpose
of the ADEA and which would avoid drawing an “utterly arbitrary line.”190
The dissent asked some important questions, such as: “How does one read a
bar against depriving ‘any individual’ of ‘employment opportunities’ to
exclude all cases where a person is looking for a job? And if Congress meant
to limit the provision’s coverage only to current employees, why didn’t it
just use the word ‘employee’?”191 The dissent also argued that even if the
court were to apply the majority’s conclusion that “status as an employee”
must be implicated to have a disparate impact claim, an employer refusing
to hire an individual would still fall under section 4(a)(2) because that has
“the most dramatic possible adverse effect on that individual’s ‘status as an
employee.’”192
The dissent also focused on the congressional intent behind enacting the
ADEA, which was to address “the incidence of unemployment, especially
long-term unemployment” among older workers, particularly the difficulty
they faced in trying to “regain employment.”193 Similarly, the dissent looked
to the practical consequences of the different readings of section 4(a)(2),
concluding that the majority’s arbitrary line “undermines the stated purpose
of the statute.”194
Judge Easterbrook, joining Judge Hamilton’s dissent in part and also
writing his own, argued that “the statute lacks a plain meaning” because it is
unclear whether or not the term “individual” includes applicants for
employment.195 He reasoned that under the majority’s holding, the word
“individual” has two different meanings within two paragraphs—it includes
applicants for employment in section 4(a)(1), but only means current or
former employees in section 4(a)(2).196 Easterbrook emphasized that
188

Judges Hamilton, Wood, Rovner, and Easterbrook dissented in Kleber II. Id. at 489 (Hamilton,
J., dissenting).
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normally, when one word is used in an adjacent paragraph, the word “means
a single thing,”197 yet the majority failed to “explain why the statute would
use ‘individual’ in dramatically different ways within the space of a few
words.”198 However, Judge Easterbrook took issue with Judge Hamilton’s
reliance on legislative purpose, stating that the court’s “job is to apply the
enacted text . . . not to plumb legislators’ hopes and goals.”199
IV. THE RESULT: ARBITRARY DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT OF EMPLOYEES
AND APPLICANTS
With their recent decisions, the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits have
effectively permitted discrimination based on age by creating substantial
barriers to employment for older individuals.200 The Eleventh Circuit
seemed to reason that even though older applicants are not protected under
the ADEA for disparate impact, they still have recourse for disparate
treatment.201 But that reasoning disregards the most salient problem many
older workers face, which is not outright discrimination, but rather neutral
hiring policies that prevent them from getting jobs for which they are more
than qualified. Further, intentional discrimination is notoriously difficult to
prove.202 Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning fails to adequately
protect older job applicants unless a plaintiff can prove a hiring policy to be
truly arbitrary, thus supporting an inference of discriminatory purpose.
Additionally, Congress intended the ADEA to afford more protection to
applicants. The attorney for the AARP Foundation Litigation representing
Dale Kleber stated that “[t]he importance of the ADEA law is less about
people being able to sue for age discrimination and more about making sure
that employers are not shaping their hiring processes in ways that prevent
older workers from getting jobs.”203 Several courts’ usage of the Wirtz
Report when interpreting the ADEA enforces this perspective because the
Report clarifies the congressional intent as one of promoting “hiring on the
basis of ability rather than age.”204 The Wirtz Report’s emphasis on hiring
197
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https://www.aarp.org/work/working-at-50-plus/info-2018/job-applicants-age-discrimination.html.
204
WIRTZ REPORT, supra note 1, at 22.

2020]

“OVER-THE-HILL”

533

elucidates that Congress’s enactment of the ADEA came from a place of
concern for older applicants.
The question remains why Congress would make such an arbitrary
distinction between employees and applicants. The court in Kleber I noted
that “we have not been presented with, and could not imagine on our own, a
plausible policy reason why Congress might have chosen to allow disparate
impact claims by current employees, including internal job applicants, while
excluding outside job applicants.”205 That Congress would make such an
arbitrary distinction is unlikely, and the fact that courts have found this
distinction to be implied by a mere wording difference is illogical. This
exemplifies that a purely textual approach in interpreting statutes can lead to
an absurdity in results.
However, the Supreme Court has held that “a literal application of a
statute, which would lead to absurd consequences, should be avoided
whenever a reasonable application can be given to it, consistent with the
legislative purpose.”206 Several state legislatures have codified the
understanding that absurd results are not intended.207 Here, an overly literal
application of section 4(a)(2) has led the courts awry, eschewing basic
conceptions of fairness and proportionality. A reasonable interpretation of
the language, taking the legislative purpose into consideration, would
resolve this arbitrary and absurd distinction between employees and
applicants and allow for disparate impact claims by applicants under the
ADEA.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS MOVING FORWARD
This Note recommends two different approaches to resolving the issue
of whether the ADEA protects job applicants on a disparate impact theory
of liability. First, advocates can seek decisions from other circuits with the
hope of creating a circuit split that will lead to Supreme Court review.
Alternatively, an outright congressional amendment to the ADEA, to
eliminate any ambiguity in the language of section 4(a)(2), would clarify
Congress’s intent to protect older applicants in employment.
A. Supreme Court Review
Other circuit courts can, and should, weigh in on this issue. It is
important, despite the holdings in Villarreal II and Kleber II, to note that the
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fight is not entirely over for older job applicants. The fact that despite the
Eleventh Circuit’s earlier en banc decision disallowing disparate impact
claims by job applicants, the Seventh Circuit initially felt comfortable
enough to hold differently and create a circuit split on the issue is cause for
some hope. If another circuit addresses this issue, it could create a circuit
split, which might prompt the United States Supreme Court to review the
issue and resolve it once and for all.208 If the Supreme Court does review this
issue, the Court should interpret the ADEA as allowing older job applicants
to make disparate impact claims. The Supreme Court can do this by adopting
the initial interpretations in Villarreal I and Kleber I, which this Note argues
were correctly decided before their rehearings en banc.
First, the Supreme Court should find that the text of the ADEA is
ambiguous. The Court should then look to the legislative purpose and intent
behind Congress’s enactment of the ADEA. The Court is also compelled to
defer to the EEOC’s interpretation under Chevron, which treats employees
and applicants alike. By following the purpose and intent of the ADEA and
the EEOC interpretation, the Supreme Court would be able to hold in favor
of older applicants receiving disparate impact protection.
Unfortunately, since there is no clear circuit split, Supreme Court review
seems unlikely at this juncture. The Supreme Court denied review in
Villarreal,209 and denied Dale Kleber’s recent petition for certiorari.210
Alternatively, the en banc panel in the majority opinion of Kleber II invited
Congress to review ADEA section 4(a)(2), proclaiming in its opinion that
“Congress, of course, remains free to do what the judiciary cannot—extend
[section] 4(a)(2) to outside job applicants, as it did in amending Title VII.”211
A congressional amendment would be the quickest way to clarify
congressional intent.
B. Congressional Amendment to the ADEA
When courts have misconstrued what Congress intended, Congress has
good reason to step in to amend the statute in order to clarify what it
meant.212 Therefore, Congress should amend the ADEA to effectuate its
208
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intent of protecting older applicants for employment. The simplest way to
do this would be to amend section 4(a)(2) to expressly include “applicants
for employment” after “to limit, segregate, or classify his employees.”213
This language would mirror Title VII and bring the ADEA in line with its
stated purpose.
Congress has frequently enacted clarifying amendments in the past to
overturn Title VII decisions that misconstrued congressional intent. For
instance, the Pregnancy Discrimination Act214 and several aspects of the
Civil Rights Act of 1991215 were aimed at overturning Supreme Court
decisions that narrowly construed Title VII.216
A congressional amendment would be the fastest and most effective way
to resolve this issue, but getting anything through today’s Congress may
prove difficult.217 However, this minor amendment to the ADEA might not
be controversial, as it would merely afford older job applicants the same
protections against discrimination that people already have when they face
hiring practices with a discriminatory impact based on race, sex, or religion.
Additionally, the amendment would surely have the backing of the AARP,
which has proved to be a powerful lobbyist.218 This issue is, and should be,
enough to warrant congressional action. Older job applicants are waiting for
Congress to afford them the same protections as employees. Congress
should work in a bipartisan manner to benefit the aging workforce
population.
CONCLUSION
The ADEA provides a significant protection for older working
Americans, but it has been over fifty years since Congress enacted the
ADEA and courts still do not enforce it the way Congress intended.
Congress made it abundantly clear in the ADEA’s statement of purpose that
the intent was to protect older workers in their search for employment when
213
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displaced from jobs. Taken together, the textual analysis, the legislative
history, and deference to the EEOC’s interpretation all confirm that
Congress intended the ADEA to cover applicants from discriminatory
practices that have a disparate impact.
“Over-the-Hill” birthday parties should be a time of celebration, not a
time of concern because an individual’s age leaves him or her vulnerable to
barriers to employment. In order to ensure that older workers are hired based
on their ability rather than denied based on their age, disparate impact claims
ought to be cognizable for job applicants under the ADEA.

